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Abstract
We explore how the threat of entry inﬂuences the innovation activ-
ity of an incumbent. We show that the incumbent’s investment
is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is
small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry,
or to make it unlikely. This is due to the entry deterrence eﬀect.
However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no longer prof-
itably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment becomes
small. Then the Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates. These results
turn out to be very robust.
1. INTRODUCTION
Even though innovations are central to growth, the question whether
more competition or a higher threat of entry leads to greater R&D in-
vestments is not settled. While we do not try to answer this general
question, we seek to explore the more speciﬁc question how the threat
of entry inﬂuences an incumbent’s investments in R&D. We build a sim-
ple model that captures two important but counteracting eﬀects. First,
a Schumpeterian eﬀect. A larger entry threat reduces the incumbent’s
expected proﬁt and therefore also its investment. Second, an entry deter-
rence eﬀect.1 To deter entry, or to make entry unlikely, a greater threat
requires a larger investment.
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1For the importance of entry in the United States, see Aghion and Howitt (2006,
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Combining the eﬀects, we ﬁnd that the incumbent’s investment is
hump-shaped in the entry threat. Intuitively, when the entry threat is
small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry or to
make entry unlikely. Then the entry deterrence eﬀect dominates the
Schumpeterian eﬀect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry
can no longer proﬁtably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment
becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates.
There is a discussion in competition policy about the optimal patent
breadth, how costly imitation should be, and when antitrust law should
require a ﬁrm with market power to share its property.2 In our model,
stronger patent protection/property rights or higher costs of imitation
can be interpreted as a weakening of the entry threat. The message
of our paper is that a mediocre threat can yield the highest incumbent
investments in R&D.
Robustness.— Robustness is a central issue in theoretical industrial
economics, see Sutton (1990). We therefore explore the robustness of our
results in depth.
We show that the hump-shaped relationship between incumbent’s
R&D investment and the entry threat is robust to diﬀerent timings.
In the original time structure, the incumbent does not know the rivals’
production costs when deciding about investment. Therefore, higher in-
vestments only make entry less likely, but entry cannot be deterred for
sure in general. In the alternative timing, the incumbent knows the ri-
vals’ costs when deciding about investment. Then the incumbent can
eﬀectively decide whether to deter entry for sure by investing suﬃciently
much, or allow entry by investing little or not at all. In both timings,
an entry threat may motivate the incumbent to invest more to defend
its monopoly. Additionally, zero or small investments become optimal in
both timings when the entry threat is overwhelming.
The robustness is remarkable, because it is seldom that fundamental
private ﬁrms are aimed at securing market advantage” (Scotchmer 2004, p. 1). See
also the empirical study of Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
2See, for example, Gallini (1992), Scotchmer (2004), Segal and Whinston (2007),
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changes of the structure of an extensive form game lead to qualitatively
unchanged results. The robustness is important, because the relationship
between the intensity of competition and R&D investment is generally
regarded as ambiguous in theoretical models. This is due to the large va-
riety of relevant eﬀects and of the deﬁnitions of competition.3 We yield
clear results by considering two important eﬀects, namely the Schum-
peterian and the entry deterrence eﬀect. In Section 5, we explain that
our model can be modiﬁed in several ways and allows for alternative
interpretations of the measure of competition.
Related Literature.— Recently, Aghion et al. (2005b)4 and Aghion
et al. (2009) applied the concept of step-by-step technological progress
to study the relationship between entry and innovation. Their models5
are intuitive, but the use of the step-by-step concept in connection with
the assumption that entry can only take place at the new technological
frontier has two unplausible consequences.6 First, an incumbent which is
close to the frontier and innovates must not fear entry at all. Second, an
incumbent which is further below the frontier cannot prevent entry, no
matter how much it invests. We consider a model without step-by-step
innovations where the incumbent can choose the size of the innovation
and the technology of potential entrants is stochastic. This avoids the
aforementioned problems and leads to a richer set of predictions.
In Aghion et al. (2005b, 2009) the inﬂuence of a higher threat on
a ﬁrm’s investment is monotone. More speciﬁcally, they show that a
higher entry threat increases the incumbent’s investment when the ﬁrm
is initially close to the technological frontier, due to the escape-entry
eﬀect; it is the other way round if the incumbent is further behind the
3See, for example, Lee and Wild (1980) vs. Delbono and Denicolo (1991), Gilbert
and Sunshine (1995), Belleﬂamme and Vergari (2006), Sacco and Schmutzler (2007),
Schmutzler (2007), Denicolo and Zanchettin (2008), and Vives (2008). For surveys,
see Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) or Gilbert (2006).
4A companion paper with an emphasis on the empirical aspects is Aghion et al.
(2008).
5The focus of Aghion et al. (2009) is rather empirically than theoretically.
6The problems do not change qualitatively if entrants enter at another, prespeciﬁed
step.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 4
frontier, due to the discouragement eﬀect. In our model, the relationship
is non-monotone because two eﬀects and not only one play a role for a
ﬁrm in a given situation.
In Aghion et al. (2005a), the interplay between an escape-competition
eﬀect and the Schumpeterian eﬀect generates an inverted-U relationship
in the aggregate7 between R&D investment and product market compe-
tition. They do not consider entry. Instead, they explore the incentives
of duopolists to invest in research and development.
Standard models in industrial organization or endogenous growth the-
ory predict that innovation activity declines with competition or entry
threat; see Aghion and Griﬃth (2005). There are several exceptions.
Beside the already discussed papers, we want to mention three recent
studies. Segal and Whinston (2007) show that in some cases “policies
that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation” (p. 1703).
The paper concentrates on innovations made by potential entrants. In
Boldrin and Levine (2009), investments in R&D are higher in a com-
petitive equilibrium than in a monopolistic equilibrium. In Bessen and
Maskin’s (2009) world of sequential and complementary innovations, no
patent protection can be socially desirable because it alleviates imitation,
which in turn makes future innovations more likely.
There are two strands of empirical literature to which our paper is
related. First, there is a literature on how domestic ﬁrms’ investments
react on the threat of competition by foreign ﬁrms. The empirical results
are mixed.8 Second, the empirical literature on patents (which can be
interpreted as barriers to potential entrants) and innovations provides no
clear evidence that stronger patents lead to higher investments in inno-
vations. The picture is rather mixed.9 This is a puzzling result (Lerner
7The inﬂuence of more competition on the investment of a certain type of ﬁrm is
monotone.
8See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995), Lelarge and Nefussi (2008), MacDonald (1994),
Pavcnik (2002), Javorcik (2004), and Aitken and Harrison (1999). Aghion et al.
(2009) ﬁnd mixed results, in accordance with their theoretical predictions: whether
there is a positive or negative eﬀect depends on the distance of the incumbent to the
technological frontier.
9See the survey of Bessen and Meurer (2008), Mokyr’s (2009) study on the role ofWEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 5
2009, p. 347). In the light of our ﬁndings, this is not surprising: even at
the ﬁrm level, the relationship between an incumbent’s investment and
the threat of entry is non-monotone.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we analyze it. The alternative timing is considered in Section
4. Further robustness issues are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 explores
the question how important the incumbent’s initial production costs are
for the relationship between incumbent’s R&D investments and the entry
threat. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
There is an incumbent, ﬁrm 0, and N rivals, ﬁrms 1,...,N. Rivals can
enter at cost Z>0. They threat the monopoly position of the incum-
bent. By investing in R&D the incumbent can lower its production costs.
Because the incumbent becomes a stronger competitor, this makes en-
try for the rivals less attractive. We will explore how the incumbent’s
optimal investment varies with the quality and the number of rivals.
At Stage 1, the incumbent chooses its R&D investment k ≥ 0. The
incumbent’s per-unit production costs are c0(k). The function c0 is twice
diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: (i) c 
0(k) < 0, (ii) c  
0(k) > 0, (iii) limk→∞ c0(k) >
Z,( i v )c 
0(0) < −1.
In words, (i) says that a higher investment lowers production costs; (ii)
that there are decreasing returns to scale in R&D; (iii) that it is not
possible to yield production costs that make entry impossible; (iv) that
when there is no entry threat, investing at least a tiny amount is optimal,
see below. Deﬁne C := c0(0). Note that Parts (i) and (iii) imply C>Z .
At Stage 2, the rivals’ per-unit production costs (c1,...,cN) are drawn.10
We will later make concrete assumptions on the distributions.
the patent system in the British Industrial Revolution, or Lerner’s (2009) study on
the impacts of shifts in patent policy across 60 countries.
10We do not model how theses costs are determined. They can be a result of already
made or planned R&D of the rival ﬁrms.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 6
At Stage 3, the rivals decide upon entry in an arbitrary order, poten-
tially simultaneously. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that in case of
indiﬀerence, a rival does not enter.
At Stage 4 all rivals that entered and the incumbent compete ` al a
Bertrand. All ﬁrms produce a homogenous good. Figure 1 summarizes
the timing.
1 Incumbent 2 (c1,...,cN) 3 Entry 4 Bertrand
invests are drawn decisions competition
Figure 1: Timing
Consumers have unit demand and a willingness-to-pay of one.11 If
there are two or more cheapest ﬁrms, they buy from the ﬁrm with the
lower production costs. This assumption is solely made to avoid open set
problems. So that the market is always served, we assume that C<1.
There is perfect information, and each ﬁrm maximizes its expected
proﬁt. Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and we
concentrate on pure strategy equilibria.
3. ANALYSIS
3.1. BERTRAND COMPETITION AND ENTRY
Standard analysis of the Bertrand game yields that rival j’s proﬁt when






M =m a x {0,min{ci}i∈M\j − cj}−Z, (1)
where j ∈{ 1,...,N} and M⊆{ 0,...,N} is the set of all ﬁrms which are
in the market, that is, the incumbent ﬁrm 0 plus the rivals that entered.
The ﬁrst term of the formula is the Bertrand proﬁt. If ﬁrm j does not
have the lowest production costs among all ﬁrms in the market, it makes
11That is, the incumbent’s revenue is at most 1. So any investment k>1i s
dominated by k = 0. So one could relax Assumption 1(iii) to c0(1) >Z .WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 7
a Bertrand proﬁt of zero. Otherwise its Bertrand proﬁt is the minimum
per-unit cost of all other ﬁrms in the market minus its own production
costs. The second term is cost of entry.
When a rival does not enter it makes zero proﬁts. Hence, no rival






M={0} ≤ 0 ∀j ∈{ 1,...,N}. (2)
With (1) this can be rewritten as
c0(k) ≤ cj + Z ∀j ∈{ 1,...,N}. (3)
When this condition does not hold, the equilibrium is such that some rival
j enters. Then c0(k) >c j for sure, which implies that the incumbent will










where we deﬁned c := minj∈{1,...,N}{cj} as the minimum production costs
of rivals.
3.2. INVESTMENT








Using (4) we can rewrite this as
E[π0(k,F)] = [1 − c0(k)][1 − F(c0(k) − Z)] − k, (6)
where F is the distribution function from which c is drawn. The in-
cumbent’s incentives to invest are determined by the marginal eﬀect of
investment on its expected proﬁt.
Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case where entry never occurs (formally,





0(k) − 1. (7)WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 8
On the one hand, a higher investment k increases the Bertrand proﬁt by
decreasing the production costs; this is captured by the ﬁrst term on the
right-hand side. On the other hand, a higher investment increases the
investment costs; this is described by the second term.





0(k)[1 − F(c0(k) − Z)]
− [1 − c0(k)]f(c0(k) − Z))c
 
0(k) − 1, (8)
where f is the density function which belongs to the distribution function
F. What has changed through the entry threat? On the one hand, the
return of investment is lower: it becomes less likely that the investment
is actually used in production; see the ﬁrst term. Put diﬀerently, it is less
l i k e l yt h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n t“ p a y so ﬀ ” . T h i si sc a l l e dt h eSchumpeterian
eﬀect.12 On the other hand, the return of investment is higher: investing
more makes entry less likely; see the second term. We call this the entry
deterrence eﬀect of investment.13 Since both eﬀects run into diﬀerent
directions, it may well be the case that the incumbent’s incentive to
invest is higher with an entry threat than without one.
For concreteness, we assume that the production costs (c1,...,cN)o f
the rivals are independently drawn from exponential density functions.
Rival j’s costs are drawn from density
fj(cj)=λje
−λjcj (9)
with λj > 0 and corresponding distribution function
Fj(cj)=1− e
−λjcj. (10)
The nice feature when all cj’s are independently and exponentially dis-
12 See also Aghion et al. (2001, 2005a). The Schumpeterian eﬀect is closely related
to the discouragement eﬀect in Aghion et al. (2005b, 2009).
13Aghion and Griﬃth (2005) call this the Darwinian eﬀect of competition. Our
entry deterrence eﬀect is similar to the escape-entry eﬀect considered by Aghion et
al. (2005b, 2009) and the escape-competition eﬀect developed in Aghion et al. (2001,
2005a).WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 9
tributed is that c is exponentially distributed, too:14
F(c)=1− e




Hence we can allow for heterogeneity of the rivals through diﬀerent
λjs without complicating the analysis. The parameter λ captures the
strength of the entry threat. It increases with the number N and the
quality λj of rivals. When λ = 0 we say that there is no entry threat.
Under the exponential distribution, we get the incumbent’s expected
proﬁt
E[π0(k,λ)] = [1 − c0(k)]e
−λ(c0(k)−Z) − k. (12)
Let the optimal investment be given by the function k∗(λ).
Proposition 1: When there is no entry threat, the incumbent
invests a positive amount: k∗(0) = c
 −1
0 (−1) > 0. When the entry threat
is huge (λ →∞ ), the incumbent does not invest. An investment of
at least ˆ k,w h e r eˆ k is an arbitrary positive investment level, cannot be
optimal when λ is suﬃciently high.
So the incumbent invests some positive amount when there is no entry
threat. In contrast, when the threat is overwhelming, entry occurs for
sure and the incumbent does not invest at all. Then the Schumpeterian
eﬀect dominates the entry deterrence eﬀect. The intuition for the last
point of Proposition 1 is as follows: when the entry threat is suﬃciently
large, entry is very likely, even when the incumbent invests ˆ k or more. So
the incumbent invests an amount less than ˆ k to save investment costs.
Next we explore the question under which circumstances a higher
entry threat increases the optimal investment.
Proposition 2: Suppose that C<1+Z
2 . The optimal invest-
ment k∗(λ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nλ for λ → 0.
Intuitively, when the initial production costs C are low, the incum-
bent’s monopoly proﬁt is high. Then the incumbent invests more when
14Technically we need the distribution of the ﬁrst-order statistics for our analysis.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 10
there is a small entry threat than when there is no threat, because it
wants to defend its monopoly. Therefore, for low entry threats the entry
deterrence eﬀect dominates the Schumpeterian eﬀect.
The next Proposition follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3: Suppose that C<1+Z
2 . The optimal invest-
ment k∗(λ) is hump-shaped in λ.
To sum up, when the entry threat is small and increases, the in-
cumbent invests more to make entry unlikely. This is due to the entry
deterrence eﬀect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no
longer proﬁtably be made unlikely and the investment becomes small.
Then the Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates.
4. ALTERNATIVE TIMING
We now consider an alternative timing where Stage 1 and 2 are inter-
changed and show that our results stay robust. Suppose that the incum-
bent already knows (c1,...,cN) when deciding about investment. The
optimal investment is denoted by k∗∗(c).
When the rivals’ production costs are large, there is no entry threat;
formally, c ≥ C −Z. Even when the incumbent does not invest, no rival
would enter. From (7) we get that the incumbent’s investment, which we




0 (−1) > 0. (13)
Observe that without an entry threat the incumbent’s investment is the
same in both timings.







0(k) < 0. (14)
So when the incumbent deters entry, it either invests k∗∗(∞) or, if that






0 (−1) for c ≥ c0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z,
c
−1
0 (c + Z)o t h e r w i s e .
(15)WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 11
When the incumbent does not want to deter entry, π0(k)=−k,s e e
(4). So the optimal investment is
k
do not deter entry(c)=0 . (16)
This yields zero proﬁts.15
Does the incumbent want to deter entry or not? Denote the invest-
ment above which entry deterrence yields a loss by ¯ k. It is implicitly
given by
1 − c0(¯ k) − ¯ k =0 . (17)
Through the assumptions made before, existence and uniqueness are
guaranteed.16
So when investing according to (15) yields an investment which is at
most ¯ k, it is optimal to deter entry and to follow this investment rule.
Otherwise, not deterring entry and zero investments are optimal, see (16).
The following lemma summarizes our ﬁndings. They are illustrated in
Figure 2.17
Lemma 1: When c is below c0(¯ k)−Z the incumbent does not invest
and entry occurs. Otherwise the incumbent invests according to (15) and
entry is deterred.
Figure 2 shows a hump-shaped relationship between the incumbent’s
investment and c. But to make the results comparable to the one yielded
15Note, even a zero investment may deter entry. So the previous equation is only
sensible when entry occurs, given a zero investment.
16¯ k exists because c0(k) is continuous in k, π
no entry
0 (k =1 )< 0, and π
no entry
0 (k =
0) > 0. Uniqueness follows from π
no entry




17The following properties of kdeter entry(c) are useful to construct the Figure.
(i) kdeter entry(c) is continuous at c = c0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z,
(ii) kdeter entry(c)h a sak i n ka tc = c0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z:
limc c0(k∗∗(∞))−Z dkdeter entry(c)/dc =0a n d
limc c0(k∗∗(∞))−Z dkdeter entry(c)/dc = −1,
(iii) kdeter entry(c) is constant in c for c >c 0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z,a n d
(iv) kdeter entry(c) is decreasing and convex in c for c <c 0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 12
¯ k
k∗∗(∞)




Figure 2: Incumbent’s investment decision
under the original timing we seek to answer the following question: how
large is the average investment of the incumbent, given λ? Again, we
assume that rivals cost are drawn from an exponential density function.
Proposition 4: limλ→0 E[k|λ]=k∗∗(∞), limλ→∞ E[k|λ]=0 .I f

c0(k∗∗(∞)) − c0(¯ k)
2
2
− (c0(¯ k) − Z)k
∗∗(∞) > 0,
then the maximum of E[k|λ] is greater than k∗∗(∞).
Intuitively, when λ → 0 the probability that c will lie in the right
region of Figure 2 approaches one. Therefore, the incumbent’s expected
investment is k∗∗(∞). In contrast, when λ →∞the probability that c
will lie in the left region of the Figure approaches one. Therefore, the
incumbent’s expected investment is zero.
The intuition for the suﬃcient condition is as follows: if λ is low,
it is very likely that c will lie in the right region of Figure 2. Then
E[k|λ] ≈ k∗∗(∞). When λ increases, it becomes more likely that c is in
the left or in the middle region of Figure 2. When k∗∗(∞) is small enough,
E[k|λ] increases with λ for small λs. The reason is that the reduction of
the probability to get a medium investment k∗∗(∞) is overcompensated
through an increased probability to get a high investment.18
18An alternative interpretation is that ¯ k is suﬃciently high. Leaving the derivativesWEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 13
The results with the alternative timing are qualitatively the same as
with the original timing. For a low entry threat, the incumbent’s average
investment is moderate. For a medium threat, the incumbent’s average
investment is, under some conditions, relatively high. For a huge entry
threat, the incumbent’s expected investment approaches zero. Therefore,
the relationship between the incumbent’s investment and the entry threat
is again hump-shaped.
5. FURTHER ROBUSTNESS ISSUES
5.1. UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
Do our results also hold when c is not exponentially distributed? Because
the intuition for our results does not depend on this assumption, we are
quite conﬁdent that the results also hold with other—though certainly
not for all—distributions. The robustness is easy to show for the uniform
assumption. Suppose c is uniformly distributed between u and ¯ u,w i t h
u < ¯ u.F i x¯ u − u and interpret a higher entry threat as a lower u or ¯ u.
Consider the original timing. We will look at three diﬀerent entry
threats and show that the incumbent’s optimal investment is highest
for a mediocre entry threat. First, when u >Cthere is essentially no
entry threat and the incumbent’s investment is k∗(0) = c
 −1
0 (−1) > 0, see
(7). Second, when u = c0(k∗(0)) + Z −  ,w h e r e  is small and positive,
then there is an entry threat: investing k∗(0) is not suﬃcient to deter
entry in all cases. From (8) we see that the marginal eﬀect of a higher
investment on the incumbent’s expected proﬁt is positive at k = k∗(0):
(i) the term [1 − F(c0(k) − Z)] is almost 1 because of the small   (i.e.,
the Schumpeterian eﬀect is weak); (ii) [1 − c0(k)]f(c0(k) − Z))c 
0(k)i s
substantial (i.e., the entry deterrence eﬀect is strong). So the incumbent
i n v e s t sm o r et h a ni nt h ec a s eu >C . Third, when ¯ u is close to zero
of c0(k) unchanged, but shifting c0(0) = C, the suﬃcient condition is easier met with a
lower C. That is, we more likely get a hump-shaped relationship when the incumbent’s
initial costs are low so that it has a strong incentive to defend its monopoly. Note
that also in the original timing we assumed that C is suﬃciently low; see Propositions
2a n d3 .WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 14
the incumbent cannot proﬁtably deter entry (this is due to Assumption
1(iii)) and the optimal investment is zero.
Consider next the alternative timing. We again look at three diﬀerent
entry threats. First, as above, when u >Cthere is essentially no entry
threat and the incumbent invests k∗∗(∞)=c
 −1
0 (−1) > 0. Second, when
u is between c0(¯ k) − Z and c0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z then the incumbent invests
at least k∗∗(∞) and sometimes strictly more. Third, when ¯ u is below
c0(¯ k)−Z then the incumbent will never invest. So again, the incumbent’s
optimal investment is highest for a mediocre entry threat.
Finally, observe that with both timings we do not need to make an
assumption on the incumbent’s initial costs. This is in contrast to the
case with an exponential distribution of c.
5.2. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Our model can be interpreted and modiﬁed in several ways.
First, consider the model without stochasticity of the rivals’ produc-
tion costs. Figure 2 shows a hump-shaped relationship between the in-
cumbent’s investment and the production costs of the most eﬃcient rival,
c. When we interpret c as the measure of the entry threat (a lower c is a
greater threat), we again get the prediction that the relationship between
the incumbent’s investment and the entry threat is hump-shaped.
Second, it is easily veriﬁed that the model (with the original as well
as with the alternative timing) stays equivalent when entry costs are
stochastic and rivals’ production costs are ﬁxed. The key insight is that
the rivals’ entry decisions stay the same, see (3). Then a higher entry
threat is interpreted as a draw of the entry costs from an exponential
density with a lower mean. The reason for on average lower entry costs
may be a weaker patent protection/property rights19 or lower costs of
imitation.
Third, one can combine several of the robustness issues. For example,
one can consider the model without stochasticity, ﬁx the rivals’ produc-
19When patent protection is weaker, it is easier or not necessary for rival ﬁrms to
invent around the incumbent’s patent.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 15
tion costs, and vary the entry costs. Then the entry costs can be taken
as a measure of the entry threat. One again yields the prediction of a
hump-shaped relationship between the incumbent’s investment and the
entry threat. Another example is to consider the model with stochastic
entry costs which are uniformly distributed.
6. HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE INCUMBENT’S INITIAL COSTS?
One directly sees that the suﬃcient condition for having a hump-shaped
relationship between the incumbent’s R&D investment and the entry
threat is easier to satisfy when the initial production costs C are lower.
This holds under both timings. But we can go beyond these results.
Consider the original timing.
Proposition 5: When there is an entry threat, the incumbent’s
optimal investment is decreasing in the initial costs C.
Observe that without an entry threat the incumbent’s optimal in-
vestment is independent of C. Therefore, Proposition 5 implies that
with high initial costs it is more likely that an entry threat (and possibly
every threat) decreases the incumbent’s optimal investment. This is sim-
ilar to the ﬁnding of Aghion et al. (2005b, 2009) for an incumbent which
is further behind the frontier.20 The intuition for our result is as follows.
The Schumpeterian eﬀect is more likely to dominate the entry deter-
rence eﬀect when the incumbent has initially high costs, because high
costs make entry deterrence (i) less proﬁtable, since the production costs
are relatively high and (ii) more diﬃcult, since for a given investment
entry becomes more likely.
With the alternative timing, similar arguments hold. Without an
entry threat, the incumbent’s optimal investment is independent of C.
When there is an entry threat, a higher C leads to lower expected in-
vestments because the range where the incumbent does not invest at all
increases and the maximal investment ¯ k decreases.
20We have no technological frontier in our model. But closeness to the frontier
corresponds best to low initial production costs C.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 16
7. CONCLUSIONS
The model formalizes the idea that an incumbent rests on its laurels
when there is no threat, ﬁghts when the threat is mediocre, and gives
up when the threat is huge. We measure the threat by the number and
quality of rival ﬁrms which may enter the market. A higher threat may
motivate an incumbent to invest more in R&D to deter entry or to make
it unlikely; then the entry deterrence eﬀect dominates. However, when
the threat is overwhelming, the incumbent has little chance to deter entry
and invests little or not at all; then the Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates.
Therefore, the relationship between the incumbent’s investment and the
entry threat is hump-shaped.
8. APPENDIX
8.1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1






−λ(c0(k)−Z) (1 + λ[1 − c0(k)]) − 1. (18)
First consider the case of no entry threat, λ =0 .T h e n
dE[π0(k,0)]/dk = −c
 
0(k) − 1. (19)
The optimal investment k∗(0) solves c 
0(k∗(0)) = −1. Hence, k∗(0) =
c
 −1
0 (−1), which is positive through Assumption 1(iv).
Next, consider the other extreme of λ →∞ . Then Assumption
1(iii) implies that entry occurs for sure for all investment levels k.S o
E[π0(k,λ)] = −k for all k. Therefore the incumbent chooses not to
invest. Formally, k∗(∞)=0 .
Finally, we prove the last part of Proposition 1. By Assumption 1
(iii) and Z>0w eh a v ec0(k) > 0 ∀k. Moreover, the expected revenue
is at most 1. Hence, k ≥ 1 leads to a loss for the incumbent. This is
dominated by k = 0, which yields a non-negative proﬁt. Therefore, an
investment of k ≥ 1 can never be optimal.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 17
From (12) we get that ∀k ∈ [ˆ k,1] we have
E[π0(k,λ)] = [1 − c0(k)]e
−λ(c0(k)−Z) − k
≤ (1 − c0(1))e
−λ(c0(1)−Z) − k
≤ (1 − c0(1))e
−λ(c0(1)−Z) − ˆ k. (20)
When λ is suﬃciently high, the last line is negative:
(1 − c0(1))e
−λ(c0(1)−Z) − ˆ k<0 (21)
which proves that
E[π0(k,λ)] < 0 ∀k ∈ [ˆ k,1]. (22)
Note that investing nothing yields a non negative expected proﬁt. Hence,
investing k ≥ ˆ k is dominated by k = 0 and cannot be optimal. 
8.2. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2





−[1 − c0(k)]e−λ(c0(k)−Z)c 
0(k)
+[1 − c0(k)]e−λ(c0(k)−Z)λc 
0(k)(c0(k) − Z). (23)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS is negative: a higher λ increases the proba-
bility of entry. That is, the return on investment decreases due to the
Schumpeterian eﬀect. The remaining terms capture the entry deterrence
eﬀect. The sign of the sum of the remaining terms is ambiguous. That
is, entry deterrence may or may not become more attractive when λ in-
creases. Given some k,w h e nλ is small (large), the remaining terms are
positive (negative). Since we seek to explore whether it is possible that
a higher entry threat increases the optimal investment, we consider the







0(k)(c0(k) − Z) − [1 − c0(k)]c
 
0(k), (24)
which has the same sign as











this is true for all k. Suppose that this is true. Then also for small λsw e
have d2E[π0(k,λ)]/dkdλ > 0.
First note that k∗(0) is unique and given by the ﬁrst-order condition
dE[π0(k∗(0),0)]/dk
! = 0. Hence, because d2E[π0(k,λ)]/dkdλ > 0f o r
small λsw em u s th a v ek∗(λ)  = k∗(0).

















dk ≥ 0. (31)







Fourth, because of (32) the inequalities (30) and (31) cannot be sat-
isﬁed for k∗(λ) <k ∗(0). Hence, because an optimum exists, and from
before we know that k∗(λ)  = k∗(0) it must hold that k∗(λ) >k ∗(0) for
small λs. 
8.3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4














∗∗(∞)dF(c), (33)WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 19
where k∗∗(∞)=c
 −1
0 (−1) and k∗∗(·)=c
−1
0 (Z +c) for the second integral,
see (15). All three integrals always have a positive probability mass
because Assumption 1(iii) implies that c0(¯ k) − Z>0.
The analysis when λ → 0o rλ →∞is especially easy. When λ → 0,
the probability that c is so high that the incumbent will invest k∗∗(∞)
approaches one. Moreover, for other levels of c, the investments are in
the interval [0,¯ k]. Hence, limλ→0 E[k|λ]=k∗∗(∞). When λ →∞ ,t h e
probability that c is in the region where the incumbent does not invest
approaches one and limλ→∞ E[k|λ]=0 .
But how large is E[k|λ] if we have a medium λ value? Since all areas
have a positive weight, k∗∗(∞)a sw e l la sk∗∗(·) are non-negative and at
most ¯ k, it follows that ¯ k>E[k|λ] > 0. But under what conditions can
E[k|λ] exceed k∗∗(∞)?
For medium values of c, i.e., when c0(¯ k) − Z<c<c 0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z,
the optimal investment is given by c
−1
0 (Z + c). Denote this part of the
investment function by k∗∗







∗∗(∞)) − Z − c. (34)
Since d2k∗∗
medium(·)/dc2 > 0 (see previous analysis) we do not overestimate
k∗∗
medium(·) by this approximation. Next, we put the approximation of
k∗∗




























−λcdc. (36)WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 20
Since the exponential density is decreasing in c and the square bracket
in the integral is linear in c, an approximation and a lower bound of the
ﬁrst integral of (36) is
 c0(k∗∗(∞))−Z
c0(¯ k)−Z
(c0(k∗∗(∞)) − Z − c0(k∗∗(∞)) + Z)+








c0(k∗∗(∞)) − c0(¯ k)
2
λe−λcdc. (37)
With (36) we get
E[k|λ] ≥















c0(k∗∗(∞)) − c0(¯ k)
2 




− (c0(¯ k) − Z)k
∗∗(∞). (39)




RHS > 0 ⇐⇒





∗∗(∞) > 0. (40)
When this condition holds, Ω(λ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nλ when λ is suﬃciently
small. Because limλ→0 Ω(λ)=k∗∗(∞) then the maximum of Ω(λ)i s
greater than k∗∗(∞). Because E[k|λ] ≥ Ω(λ), then also the maximum of
E[k|λ] is greater than k∗∗(∞). 
8.4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5









which is negative under the exponential distribution. A result which we
will use below.WEINSCHENK: ENTRY AND INCUMBENT INNOVATION 21
Let the function k∗∗∗(C|λ) denote the optimal investment depending
on incumbent’s initial costs C,g i v e ns o m eλ. We next prove by contra-
diction. Let CI <C II and suppose that k∗∗∗(CII|λ) ≥ k∗∗∗(CI|λ). One














The optimality of k∗∗∗(CII|λ) requires that the term with the integral is













dk ≤ 0. (44)
But since k∗∗∗(CII|λ) ≥ k∗∗∗(CI|λ), CI <C II,a n dd2E[π0(k,F)]/dkdC <











which is a contradiction.
Observe that this result does not require that c is exponentially dis-
tributed. We only used d2E[π0(k,F)]/dkdC < 0, which also holds with
other distributions. 
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